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PROTECTING DISCRETION:
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
TO THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
Donald N. Zillman*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996 the Federal Tort Claims Act turns fifty.' Few statutes
reach the half-century mark only slightly amended and with their
primary purposes still intact. The Federal Tort Claims Act is one
such rare statute.
The purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was to make
the United States liable for the torts of its employees committed in
the scope of their employment.' Today that sounds commonplace.
Half a century ago, however, a considerable legislative effort was
needed to overturn the doctrine of sovereign immunity that forbade
the recovery of tort damages against the United States.3
Congress's rejecting sovereign immunity did not mean making the
United States liable for every allegedly tortious act. The crucial de-
termination that remained was what government harms would still
be shielded from tort liability. The primary statutory answer to that
question was the discretionary function exception, codified at 28
U.S.C. section 2680(a). The pertinent portion of section 2680(a)
provides that the United States is not liable for any claim "based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or per-
form a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused."
* Dean and Edward Godfrey Professor of Law, University of Maine School of
Law. My thanks to Ms. Michelle Kane, University of Maine School of Law Class of
1996, for her fine research assistance.
1. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671-2680 (Supp. V 1993). The jurisdictional grant of power to the federal courts
to decide Federal Tort Claims Act cases appears at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. V
1993).
2. FTCA suits are authorized "for injury or loss of property or personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
agency while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant
in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred . . .
28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. V 1993).
3. See generally Donald N. Zillman, Congress, Courts and Government Tort Lia-
bility: Reflections on the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 1989 UTAH L. REv. 687, 690-95 (1989) [hereinafter Reflections].
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Few other sections of the FTCA aid in the definition of "discre-
tionary functions." The legislative history, spread over several ses-
sions of Congress, gives little additional guidance.4 In effect
Congress invited the federal agencies (who were authorized to settle
claims against them administratively) and the federal courts (who
were tasked with deciding the claims that could not be settled) to
define "discretionary functions."
And so they have. This Article continues a series of this Author's
studies of the judicial interpretation of the discretionary function ex-
ception.5 The initial study in 1977 examined lower federal court de-
cisions in search of guidance.6 At that time only a single United
States Supreme Court case, Dalehite v. United States,7 provided gui-
dance. Dalehite was a unique case on its facts. The guidance for
other cases from the opinion was somewhat muddled. By 1977
Dalehite was nearly a quarter-century old.
The two subsequent articles in 19858 and 19899 drew on new
Supreme Court discretionary function cases. Between 1984 and
1991, the Supreme Court issued near-unanimous decisions in three
cases that squarely raised the application of the discretionary func-
tion exception. 10 A lack of Supreme Court law changed to a relative
wealth of it.
This Article assesses discretionary function law at the FTCA's
half-century mark. This Article reviews the Supreme Court prece-
dents, and examines all of the over 100 reported federal court of
appeals and district court discretionary function cases since the cru-
cial Supreme Court decision in Berkovitz v. United States" in 1988.
An analysis of that jurisprudence gives a good sense of the scope of
United States tort liability as of 1995.
II. THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION-THE SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENTS
The student of recent Federal Tort Claims Act cases involving
such major issues as liability for radiation injuries from the nuclear
4. Id. at 703-08.
5. Reflections, supra note 3; Donald N. Zillman, Regulatory Discretion: The
Supreme Court Reexamines the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 110 Mn. L. REv. 115 (1985) [hereinafter Regulatory Discretion]; Donald
N. Zillman, The Changing Meanings of Discretion" Evolution In the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 76 Mu-. L. REv. 1 (1977) [hereinafter Changing Meanings].
6. Changing Meanings, supra note 5.
7. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
8. Regulatory Discretion, supra note 5.
9. Reflections, supra note 3.
10. United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991); Berkovitz v. United States.
486 U.S. 531 (1988); United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
11. 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
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weapons program, 12 failures to inspect aircraft or mines in which
mass disasters have occurred,13 or misregulation of the savings and
loan industry' 4 might lose sight of the origins of the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The statute was a rather small part of the 1946 Legisla-
tive Reorganization Act.' The FrCA was inspired by equal meas-
ures of concern for injured citizens and unhappiness with the private
bill system that forced Congress to consider thousands of individual
requests for monetary relief for harms in tort. The contemporane-
ous record of private bills suggests that Congress was inclined pri-
marily to grant relief in only a few recurrent factual situations, most
notably automobile accidents.' 6 This background hardly suggests
novel or expansive liability.
When the United States Supreme Court reviewed its first discre-
tionary function case, Dalehite v. United States, 7 in 1953, caution
prevailed. Dalehite posed the prospect of mass disaster liability in
the second year of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Two ships loaded
with fertilizer-grade ammonium nitrate exploded in the harbor of
Texas City, Texas, with heavy loss of life and property damage. The
explosion resulted in 8500 plaintiffs seeking $200 million in dam-
ages. The plaintiffs claimed government negligence in the manufac-
ture, bagging, shipment, and storage of the ammonium nitrate
(which was destined for the European recovery program), and negli-
gent firefighting by the Coast Guard.
A majority of the Supreme Court held the discretionary function
exception protected the United States against all allegations of fault.
The Court held discretion included more than the initiation of pro-
grams (here the decision to engage in export for the European re-
covery program). "Where there is room for policy judgment and
decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subor-
dinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance
with official directions cannot be actionable."' 8 In the phrase that
became the most quoted portion of Dalehite the Court concluded
that all government decisions under challenge were "responsibly
made at a planning rather than operational level.""9
Dalehite remained the single Supreme Court discretionary func-
tion decision for thirty years. Congress did not amend section
12. See, e.g., Bamson v. United States, 816 F.2d 549 (10th Cir. 1987), cer. denied,
484 U.S. 896 (1987); Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984); Collins v.
United States, 783 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1986).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991).
15. See Reflections, supra note 3, at 708-15.
16. Id. at 713-14 (110 of 162 private bills studied involved automobile accidents).
17. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
18. Id at 36.
19. Id at 42.
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2680(a). Between 1953 and 1984 hundreds of lower federal court
decisions set out the contours of discretionary functions. The deci-
sions made clear that discretionary function claims would not bar
government liability in such torts as vehicle negligence, building
maintenance, medical practice, and airport ground control errors.2"
By contrast, section 2680(a) generally did protect the government
from claims arising out of flood control and irrigation, military and
foreign policy decisions, law enforcement activity,21 and regulatory
and licensing activity. Other allegedly discretionary actions forced
courts to weigh the Dalehite language with care 2
Two unrelated aircraft accidents provided the occasion for the
1984 Supreme Court decision of United States v. Varig Airlines- and
a second look at discretionary function. Both cases involved aircraft
fires. The plaintiffs alleged that government liability should be
based on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) failure to
perform an inspection that would have detected the fire hazard.
The Supreme Court's formulation of the Varig case was that it
reviewed' a decision by FAA authorities to rely on manufacturer
representatives to do the safety inspections rather than doing the
inspections themselves. The Court concluded these decisions were
entitled to the protection of the discretionary function exception.-
5
The Court began with the obvious: "The discretionary function
exception... marks the boundary between Congress's willingness to
impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect
certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private
individuals." 26
The Court then reaffirmed Dalehite noting that "it is unneces-
sary-and indeed impossible-to define with precision every con-
tour of the [exception]."27 However, two factors stood out. First "it
is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor" that
governed. 28 The question was whether the challenged acts were "of
the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from tort
liability."'29 Second, "whatever else the discretionary function ex-
ception may include, it plainly was intended to encompass the dis-
cretionary acts of the Government acting in its role as a regulator of
20. Changing Meanings, supra note 5, at 12.
21. Id. at 13.
22. Id. at 13-14 (two factual situations reaching differing results were claims for
sonic boom damage and suits for failure to care for psychiatric patients).
23. 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
24. See Regulatory Discretion, supra note 5, at 131-32.
25. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 815-16.
26. Id at 808.
27. Id. at 813.
28. Id
29. Id.
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the conduct of private individuals. 3 ° Congress's objective in sec-
tion 2680(a) was to "prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative
and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and
political policy through the medium of an action in tort. '31
While Varig was not a model of clarity,32 it did advance discretion-
ary function analysis beyond Dalehite's simplistic "planning v. oper-
ational" guidance. Varig's most certain effect was virtually to bar
recovery for alleged failure of government regulatory activity. 33
The post-Varig cases also began paying closer attention to the stat-
utes and regulations that purported to direct the conduct of the al-
legedly negligent government officials. 34 That factor became of
central importance in Berkovitz v. United States35 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1988.
The infant plaintiff in Berkovitz contracted a disabling case of po-
lio after ingesting an oral polio vaccine. His parents alleged negli-
gence on the part of the Division of Biologic Standards of the
National Institutes of Health and the Food and Drug Administra-
tion in licensing and releasing the Orimune vaccine manufactured
by Lederle Laboratories.
Because Berkovitz involved government regulation of private
business, an expansive reading of Varig might have barred the claim
with little investigation. The Supreme Court, however, pursued a
different route. It began by reiterating Varig's "nature of the con-
duct, rather than the status of the actor" language. 36 This prompted
the Court to examine two factors. The first was "whether the action
is a matter of choice for the acting employee."37 The protection of
the discretionary function would not apply "when a federal statute,
regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an
employee to follow."'38 The second, assuming that the employee
was allowed to exercise judgment, was "whether that judgment is of
the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to
shield."'39 The only judgments protected by section 2680(a) are
those based "on considerations of public policy."4 This conclusion
30. Id. at 813-14.
31. Id. at 814.
32. Regulatory Discretion, supra note 5, at 131-42.
33. Reflections, supra note 3, at 720-21 (of 23 post-Varig cases only two were not
decided in favor of the United States under § 2680(a)).
34. Id. at 726-28.
35. 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
36. Id. at 536 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 537.
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was tied into the Varig discussion of the desire to prevent judicial
second guessing of social, economic, and political policy decisions.4"
The Supreme Court's review of the licensing and release of the
Orimune vaccine concentrated on the first part of the test, namely,
whether the statutes, regulations, and policies allowed discretion.
The Court engaged in a considerable review of the licensing process.
It remanded the case for further proceedings in language that sug-
gested that certain of the actions appeared to be protected by sec-
tion 2680(a) and others did not.42
United States v. Gaubert,43 decided in 1991, is the Supreme
Court's most recent review of the discretionary function exception.
The case was one of many arising out of the savings and loan scan-
dals of the 1980s. Federal intervention in purportedly unstable sav-
ings and loan institutions gave rise to two categories of complaints.
In the first category customers complained that the federal regula-
tors did too little to warn them or to correct the instabilities of cer-
tain institutions. In the second category savings and loan
management complained that the federal authorities had made a
satisfactory situation worse, thus costing the investors and owners
money. The Gaubert complaint was of the second variety. The gov-
ernient intervention at issue involved a combination of general ad-
vice on running the savings and loan institution and some closer
involvement in the day-to-day business decisions of the enterprise.
In Gaubert the Supreme Court restated the two-part Berkovitz
test: 1) Has judgment been controlled by a statute, regulation, or
policy?" 2) Even if discretion remains with the federal official, is
the judgment of the kind section 2680(a) was meant to protect? The
Court identified three situations involving the presence of statutes,
regulations, or policies. In the first situation the law mandates par-
ticular conduct and the government officer or employee obeys the
law. Here section 2680(a) applies "because the action will be
deemed in furtherance of the policies which led to the promulgation
of the regulation."45 In the second situation the law mandates par-
ticular conduct and the officer or employee violates the law. Here
"there will be no shelter from liability because there is no room for
choice and the action will be contrary to policy."46 In the third sce-
nario the law allows the officer or employee to exercise discretion.
Here "the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presump-
tion that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves
41. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814. Ibis also draws from lan-
guage in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1952): "Where there is room for
policy judgment and decision there is discretion." Id at 36.
42. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. at 543-48.
43. 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991).
44. Id at 1273-74.
45. Id at 1274.
46. Id
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consideration of the same policies which led to the promulgation of
the regulations. '47 That strong presumption also most likely re-
solves the second Berkovitz issue-whether the policy is the type
protected by section 2680(a). To avoid dismissal a plaintiff "must
allege facts which would support a finding that the challenged ac-
tions are not the kind of conduct that can be said to be grounded in
the policy of the regulatory regime."'  That is determined not by
the officer's "subjective intent ... but on the nature of the actions
taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis."49
The reformulated Berkovitz test then was applied to the Gaubert
allegations. The Court found no statutes or regulations that man-
dated a particular form of regulation. The overall legal structure
allowed, if not encouraged, case by case regulation and informal
means of supervision.5 0
The Court also ruled for the government on the second part of the
Berkovitz test. The plaintiff argued that even if the government ac-
tions were permissible under law "they involved the mere applica-
tion of technical skills and business expertise," not the social,
economic, and political judgements protected by section 2680(a). 1
The Court disagreed. Such actions by the federal regulators as
changes in management, hiring of consultants, advising on litigation,
mediating salary disputes, and negotiating with Texas officials were
policy activities. These were actions "within the purview of the poli-
cies behind the statutes.""2 The "routine or frequent nature of a
decision, 53 essentially the operational side of the Dalehite planning-
operational distinction, 4 did not disqualify it from section 2680(a)
protection. If that were so, the Court observed, "countless policy-
based decisions by regulators exercising day-to-day supervisory au-
thority would be actionable."5
III. VARIG, BERKOVITZ, AND GAUBERTIN THE LOWER COURTS
What has been the impact of the Varig and Berkovitz precedents,
later enhanced by Gaubert, on discretionary function decisions in
the lower federal courts? 6 In the considerable majority of cases the
discretionary function exception won the case for the United States,
47. Id
48. 1d at 1275.
49. IM
50. Idt at 1277-78.
51. ld. at 1278.
52. Id. at 1279.
53. IM
54. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. at 42.
55. United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. at 1279.
56. The Author examined all relevant court of appeals and federal district court
cases decided in 1990 and after. The date was chosen in order to allow a reasonable
time for courts and advocates to digest the 1988 Berkovitz opinion. Fifty-eight fed-
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ending the plaintiff's chance of recovery. Of fifty-eight court of ap-
peals cases, forty were ended by application of section 2680(a). Of
eighty district court cases, discretionary function barred recovery in
sixty-one. Success on the discretionary function issue removes only
one government challenge to recovery. Other statutory defenses or
failure on the underlying negligence action also can leave plaintiff
without relief.
A. Recurrent Fact Patterns
Prior studies of the discretionary function exception have identi-
fied recurrent fact situations in which section 2680(a) immunity is
likely to be granted or denied.' The Supreme Court's refinement
of discretionary functions in Varg, Berkovitz, and Gaubert has had
an impact on these recurrent fact situations. Four types of cases tra-
ditionally have been treated as not involving protected discretionary
functions.5' They are vehicle accidents, premises liability in or
around structures (as contrasted to liability for parks and other open
spaces), medical malpractice, and negligent aircraft ground control.
There are no recent cases in which the government asserted that
section 2680(a) would bar federal liability for vehicle operation,
medical malpractice, or controller error. These long-recognized ar-
eas of FTCA liability remain unchanged by Varig, Berkovitz, and
Gaubert.
The area of premises liability in or around structures, however,
has become less predictable. As in vehicle operation or medical
malpractice, the courts may draw upon the ample private sector
precedents to assess the care of the reasonable premises owner to
persons on the property. Many of the cases seem like garden variety
torts with few policy implications. Nevertheless government counsel
have tried to extend the protection of section 2680(a) to certain
premises liability claims.
The results have been mixed. In Schneider v. United States59 and
Soni v. United States60 the inadequate placement of a railing was
found to be a policy matter and protected by section 2680(a). Coats
v. Luedtke Engineering Co.61 and Greene v. United States6 recog-
nized that section 2680(a) would protect the decision whether to in-
stall a railing. Once an installation decision was reached, however,
ordinary care was required to govern the installation.
eral court of appeals cases and 80 district court cases not involving a subsequent
court of appeals decision were found.
57. See, e.g., Changing Meanings, supra note 5, at 12-14; Reflections, supra note 3,
at 719-20.
58. Id
59. 734 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. La. 1990).
60. 739 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
61. 744 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Wis. 1990).
62. 745 F. Supp. 1486 (E.D. Mo. 1990), rev'd, 872 F.2d 236 (8th Cir. 1989).
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The most interesting premises liability case is the 1990 First Cir-
cuit decision in Ayer v. United States.63 A visitor to Vandenberg Air
Force missile launch base was injured allegedly due to a lack of rail-
ings around the launch pad. The government responded with a
showing that Air Force officials had weighed with considerable care
the decision not to install the railings. "First, [the Air Force] wanted
Vandenberg to maintain the same configuration as other launch sites
nationwide to assure realistic and transferrable training there. Sec-
ond, the Air Force wanted to retain maximum floor mobility so as
not to affect the survivability of the [launch control chamber] in the
event of an attack."' The court was properly impressed and
granted the government's discretionary function motion.
Pre-Berkovitz cases also identified several factual situations in
which courts were likely to recognize that a discretionary function
was involved.65 These included flood control activities, military ac-
tivities, and matters of foreign relations. Many cases since 1990
have explored these matters. The majority have followed past prac-
tice and applied section 2680(a) to protect the United States from
liability.6 6 A significant minority of cases, however, rejects the ap-
plication of section 2680(a) to bar recovery for any activity that im-
63. 902 F.2d 1038 (1st Cir. 1990).
64. Ia at 1043-44.
65. See, e.g., Changing Meanings, supra note 5, at 13-14; Regulatory Discretion,
supra note 3, at 118-20.
66. See Black Hills Aviation v. United States, 34 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 1994) (acci-
dent investigation on missile range); D.B.S. ex reL C.R.S. v. United States, 11 F.3d
791 (8th Cir. 1993) (military program for screening donated blood); Kirchmann v.
United States, 8 F.3d 1273 (8th Cir. 1993) (environmental contamination at missile
site); Powers v. United States, 996 F.2d 1121 (11th Cir. 1993) (failure to advise of
flood insurance); Blakey v. U.S.S. Iowa, 991 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1993) (conduct of
Navy investigation into gun explosion on battleship); Daigle v. Shell Oil Company,
972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992) (pollutant clean-up at Rocky Mountain Arsenal);
Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 411 (1992) (Panamanian riot damage); Industria Panificadora v. United
States, 957 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992) (property
losses in connection with Panamanian invasion); Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552
(11th Cir. 1990) (control of Haitian detainees); Buchanan v. United States, 915 F.2d
969 (5th Cir. 1990) (control of Cuban detainees); Creek Nation Indian Housing Au-
thority v. United States, 905 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1990) (government choice of bomb
design); Ayer v. United States, 902 F.2d 1038 (1st Cir. 1990) (missile launch site
design); Hart v. United States, 894 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
908 (1990) (military MIA designation); Prescott v. United States, 858 F. Supp. 1461
(D. Nev. 1994) (nuclear tests); Sauders v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Author., 856 F. Supp. 1066
(D.S.C. 1994) (waterflow in canal); Bowman v. United States, 848 F. Supp. 979
(M.D. Fla. 1994) (Navy toxics storage); Crumpton v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 751
(D.D.C. 1994) (release of military information); Balmaceda v. United States, 815 F.
Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Fisher Bros. Sales v. United States, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 1384 (3rd Cir. Jan. 25, 1995) (exclusion of Chilean grapes from
U.S. market); Breland v. United States, 791 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (opera-
tion of Army firing range); Hobdy v. United States, 762 F. Supp. 1459 (D. Kan.
1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1992) (military criminal fraud investigation); Sim-
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plicates military or foreign policy.67 These cases often turn on a
government officer's violation of a statute or regulation.'
Six other categories of cases have provided much work for the
lower federal courts since 1990. Here the results have been less pre-
dictable than they might have been in the years prior to Varig and
Berkovitz.
Fourteen cases involve alleged government error in the regulation
of financial institutions or the administration of government loan or
grant programs.6 9 In twelve cases the courts ruled for the United
States on section 2680(a).70 Typically defendants in these cases
counterclaimed against the United States, alleging improper govern-
ment regulation7 ' or a failure of the government to act quickly
enough in placing troubled financial institutions into receivership.' 2
Both before and particularly after the Supreme Court decision in
mons v. United States, 754 F. Supp. 274 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (military procedure for
reclassification of personnel missing in action).
67. See Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1992) (protection of Ne-
vada Nuclear Test Site workers; Government claim that all aspects of nuclear testing
program are protected by § 2680(a) is rejected); Redlands Soccer Club v. Depart-
ment of the Army, 835 F. Supp. 803 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (Army waste disposal); Sumner
v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 1358 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (exploding dud ordnance on
military base); Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427 (D.D.C.
1991), rev'd, 904 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1990), revd, 28 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (AID
overseas medical practices); Musick v. United States, 768 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Va.
1991) (Air Force overflight).
68. See, e.g., Sumner v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 1358 (M.D. Tenn. 1992); Mu-
sick v. United States, 768 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Va. 1991).
69. ALX El Dorado, Inc. v. Southwest Savings & Loan, 36 F.3d 409 (5th Cir.
1994) (negligent supervision); McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1993)
(failed S&L); Cooper v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 978 F.2d 602 (10th
Cir. 1992) (wrongful termination of bonds destroys plaintiff's business); Lundstrum
v. Lyng, 954 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1991) (farmer claims improper handling of his loan);
FDIC v. Irwin, 916 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1990) (bank sues for improper determination
of insolvency); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1989) (government
liquidation of property in connection with unpaid loan; application of the discretion-
ary function exception denied); Brackin v. United States, 913 F.2d 858 (11th Cir.
1990) (improper division of farm property for benefits program); FDIC v. Mmahat,
907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991) (FDIC delay in placing
S&L into receivership); Biase v. Kaplan, 852 F. Supp. 268 (D.NJ. 1994) (share-
holder of S&L sues government regulators); FDIC v. FSSS, 829 F. Supp. 317 (D.
Alaska 1993) (FDIC decisions on settlement of note); Wohiford v. United States,
823 F. Supp. 386 (W.D. Va. 1992) (Farmers Home Administration handling of farm-
ers' loans); Hale House Center, Inc. v. FDIC, 788 F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(FDIC failure to warn about unstable bank); FDIC v. Cheng, 787 F. Supp. 625 (N.D.
Tex. 1991) (attempts to recoup bond trading losses by failed S&L); Ackerley v.
United States, 741 F. Supp. 1519 (D. Wyo. 1990) (FDIC negligent failure to make
payments to plaintiff) (2680(a) rejected for lack of showing of policy considerations).
70. The two cases where the Government's assertion of § 2680(a) was rejected
were both decided prior to Gaubert. See Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242 (9th
Cir. 1990); Ackerley v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 1519 (D. Wyo. 1990).
71. See eg., FDIC v. Irwin, 916 F2d at 1052.
72. See eg., FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d at 551.
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Gaubert the courts have treated the government action as reflecting
protected discretion.
Courts have not chosen to bar claims because they do not involve
wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage-the catego-
ries of claims recognized by the jurisdictional grant of the Federal
Tort Claims Act.73 Instead the courts have looked to the Berkovitz
standards. They have generally found that the federal statutes and
regulations offer wide discretion to the federal financial officials.74
As a result Gaubert has undercut plaintiffs' hopes that such deci-
sions would not be seen as involving the kind of discretion Congress
meant to protect.7 5 Courts have uniformly held that federal finan-
cial regulators were making policy decisions involving social, polit-
ical, and economic choices.76
The second factual category in which the courts have fairly con-
sistently sustained government action encompasses law enforcement
torts beyond assault, battery, and false imprisonment, which are
clearly covered by the FrCA.77 Seventeen of the twenty cases iden-
tified resulted in a section 2680(a) decision favorable to the govern-
ment.78  The decisions challenged are made by police,79
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. V 1993).
74. See, e.g., Cooper v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 602, 611 (10th Cir.
1992); Lundstrum v. Lyng, 954 F.2d 1142, 1147 (6th Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Irwin, 916
F.2d at 1054; Brackin v. United States, 913 F.2d 858, 860 (11th Cir. 1990).
75. United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267, 1275-76 (1991).
76. See, e.g., McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1993); Lundstrum v.
Lyng, 954 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1993).
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. V 1993). See also Beran v. United States, 759
F. Supp. 886 (D.D.C. 1991) (discussing interplay between sections 2680(a) and
2680(h)).
78. Weissich v. United States, 4 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2705 (1994) (failure of probation officers to warn federal prosecutor of threat
against him); Blakey v. U.S.S. Iowa, 991 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1993) (Navy investigation
of shipboard explosion, resulting in death of sailor); Johnson v. Sawyer, 980 F.2d
1490 (5th Cir. 1992), modified, 4 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 1993) (IRS agent disclosure of
private information not protected under § 2680(a)); Industria Panificadora v. United
States, 957 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992) (U.S. author-
ities' failure to provide police protection during Panamanian invasion, resulting in
damage to property); Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776 (1st Cir. 1992) (Cus-
toms authorities' failure to supervise agents); Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355
(1st Cir. 1991) (DEA failure to investigate allegations against an agent); Adras v.
Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1990) (Attorney General's decisions on parole of
Haitian refugees); McElroy v. United States, 861 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Tex. 1994)
(conduct of drug investigation); Merced v. City of New York, 856 F. Supp. 826
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denial of police protection); Bailor v. Salvation Army, 854 F. Supp.
1341 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (release of inmate); Mesa v. United States, 837 F. Supp. 1210
(S.D. Fla. 1993) (service of arrest warrant on wrong individual); Matin v. United
States, 814 F. Supp. 1468 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (failure to warn victims not protected by
§ 2680(a) due to absence of policy based decision); Reeves v. United States, 809 F.
Supp. 92 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms' failure to pro-
tect victim in manufacture of explosives); Patel v. United States, 806 F. Supp. 873
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (§ 2680(a) rejected due to lack of policy judgment in conduct in
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prosecutors,8 0 and corrections officers.81 What statutes and regula-
tions exist generally leave matters to the discretion of the officers.'s
The courts then are willing to view the matters as policy decisions
that Congress intended to leave to the executive and judicial branch
officers.83
The third set of recurrent cases (and one that occurs more fre-
quently now than in past decades) involves alleged government fail-
ure to provide safety protection in situations involving a private
contractor. In such cases the victim has been injured and seeks not
only workers' compensation recovery against the contractor-em-
ployer but also recovery against the government. The post-
Berkovitz courts generally have sided with the government under
section 2680(a). Of the seventeen cases identified, only four did not
rule for the government.' The four, however, are all court of ap-
drug raid); Flax v. United States, 791 F. Supp. 1035 (D.NJ. 1992), vacated, 983 F.2d
1050 (3rd Cir. 1992), remanded to 847 F. Supp. 1183 (D.NJ. 1994) (FBI handling of
kidnapping); Wilson v. United States, 767 F. Supp 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (parole revo-
cation); Hobdy v. United States, 762 F. Supp. 1459 (D. Kan. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 20
(10th Cir. 1992) (claim of negligent criminal investigation banned); Beran v. United
States, 759 F. Supp. 886 (D.D.C. 1991) (claim of malicious prosecution against Se-
cret Service agent barred); Ward v. United States, 738 F. Supp. 129 (D. Del. 1990)
(Postal Service conduct during investigation of disability claim, allegedly resulting in
psychological and physical injury).
79. Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776 (1st Cir. 1992) (customs agents).
80. Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1990) (Attorney General's deci-
sions on parole of Haitian refugees).
81. Weissich v. United States, 4 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct.
2705 (1994) (probation officers).
82. Id See also Blakey v. U.S.S. Iowa, 991 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1993); Attallah v.
United States, 955 F.2d 776 (1st Cir. 1992); Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355 (1st
Cir. 1991).
83. See, eg., Weissich v. United States, 4 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 1993). cerL de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 2705 (1994) (warnings to potential victims involve policy choices
including "how much of the agency's resources it should commit to identifying vic-
tims, what standards it should adopt to determine which potential victims to notify,
and how it should go about notifying them"); Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355,
362 (1st Cir. 1991) ("The [Drug Enforcement Administration's] mission can be effec-
tively served only if the agency is free to balance its need for internal security against
its need to prevent the squandering of-scarce resources in the endless chasing of wild
geese"); Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1990).
84. Kirchmann v. United States, 8 F.3d 1273 (8th Cir. 1993); Duff v. United
States, 999 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1993); Layton v. United States, 984 F.2d 1496 (8th Cir.
1993), reh'g denied, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 4857 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 1993), cert de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 213 (1993); Phillips v. United States, 956 F.2d 1071, 1077 (11th Cir.
1992) (§ 2680(a) protection denied for failure to obey Army Corps of Engineers
safety manual); Routh v. United States, 941 F.2d 853, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1991)
(§ 2680(a) protection denied for lack of public policy content to decision); Tracor/
MBA Inc. v. United States, 933 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1991); Murdock v. Employers
Insurance, 917 F.2d 1065, 1073 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 951 F.2d 907 (8th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2996 (1992) (§ 2680(a) protection denied); McCall v.
United States Dep't of Energy, 914 F.2d 191, 196 (9th Cir. 1990) (§ 2680(a) protec-
tion denied in face of Montana nondelegable duty to provide safe workplace); Fort-
1995]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
peals cases and involve instances where the court has found both a
violation of law85 and an absence of a policy based judgment.86
A fourth category involves claims arising out of failures to protect
citizens from pollutants.' Some involve the government as the pol-
luter.8s In other cases the government is sued for its lack of care in
cleaning up a private party's pollution.89 Regardless of the identity
of the polluter, section 2680(a) provides ample protection for the
United States. Only three of fifteen cases have not ruled for the
government under section 2680(a). 90
Two other categories of cases show less decisive results for the
government. The first involves an injury on government owned land
(as contrasted to buildings). The prototypical case is the national
park visitor injured by some element of the wilderness park experi-
ence. The government then is forced to defend itself against charges
ney v. United States, 912 F.2d 722,726 (4th Cir. 1990) (dicta on probable application
of § 2680(a)); Kandarge v. United States Navy, 849 F. Supp. 304 (D.N.J. 1994); Hall
v. United States General Services Admin., 825 F. Supp. 427 (D.N.H. 1993); Webster
v. United States, 823 F. Supp. 1544 (D. Mont. 1992), aff'd, 22 F.3d 221 (9th Cir.
1994); Clark v. United States, 805 F. Supp. 84 (D.N.H. 1992); Doud v. United States,
797 F. Supp. 138 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Zocco v. United States, 791 F. Supp. 595
(E.D.N.C. 1992); Moody v. United States, 753 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); Per-
shing v. United States, 736 F. Supp. 132 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
85. Phillips v. United States, 956 F.2d 1071 (11th Cir. 1992).
86. Routh v. United States, 941 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1991); McCall v. United States
Dep't of Energy, 914 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1990).
87. Employers Ins. of Warsaw v. United States, 27 F.3d 245 (7th Cir. 1994);
Kirchmann v. United States, 8 F.3d 1273 (8th Cir. 1993) (government disposal of
trichloroethalenes (TCE) at missile site); Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th
Cir. 1992) (cleanup of Rocky Mountain arsenal); Lockett v. United States, 938 F.2d
630 (6th Cir. 1991) (EPA failure to warn of contaminated scrapyard); Richland-Lex-
ington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Properties, Inc. 854 F. Supp. 400 (D.S.C. 1994) (loca-
tion and cleanup of pollutants); Salter v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. Ala.
1994); Laurence v. United States, 851 F. Supp. 1445 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Bowman v.
United States, 848 F. Supp. 979 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't
of Army, 835 F. Supp. 803 (M.D. Pa. 1993), judgment entered sub nom. O'Neal v.
Dep't of Army, 852 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Pa. 1994); United States v. Martech USA,
Inc., 800 F. Supp. 865 (D. Alaska 1992); United States v. Amtreco, Inc., 790 F. Supp.
1576 (M.D. Ga. 1992); Stewman v. Mid-South Wood Products of Mena, Inc., 784 F.
Supp. 611 (W.D. Ark. 1992), aff'd, 993 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Skipper, 781 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D.N.C. 1991); Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corp. v. United
States, 780 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
88. See, e.g., Kirchmann v. United States, 8 F.3d 1273 (8th Cir. 1993); Daigle v,
Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992).
89. See, e.g., Lockett v. United States, 938 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1991).
90. Salter v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (violation of manu-
facturer safety standard which was made mandatory by government regulation);
Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of Army, 835 F. Supp. 803, 808 (M.D. Pa. 1993)
(waste disposal decisions were not policy "in more direct furtherance of the agency
or department's congressionally delegated mission"), judgment entered sub nom.
O'Neal v. Department of Army, 852 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Santa Fe Pacific
Realty Corp. v. United States, 780 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (government vio-
lates its own regulations; sale in damaged containers is not a policy-based judgment).
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that it should have provided better protection or warning. Prior to
Berkovitz courts had reached differing results in these cases.91 The
Berkovitz tests sharpen the analytical framework. They provide
more consistent results in the government's favor. Of fifteen cases
in this category only two reject the discretionary function claim. 2
Plaintiffs generally win cases when there is a clear regulatory provi-
sion that compels government safety action 93 or when the court con-
cludes that no matters of political, economic, or social policy were
involved in the government decision. 4 By contrast the government
ordinarily wins when the court adopts their argument that a central
philosophy of the federal parks program is to keep wild areas wild
and impliedly dangerous.9
The final area involves government licensing and regulation other
than financial regulation. These cases are the direct Varig and
Berkovitz descendants, as they involve government officers making
potentially harmful decisions as they act pursuant to statutory au-
thority to inspect and to license. The ten cases that fit this model 96
91. See Regulatory Discretion, supra note 5, at 119 and Reflections, supra note 3,
at 724.
92. See, ag., LeSoeur v. United States, 21 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 1994) (discretion
protected); Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1993) (discretion pro-
tected), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1829 (1994); Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716 (4th
Cir. 1993) (discretion protected); Kiehn v. United States, 984 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir.
1993) (discretion protected); Johnson v. United States Dep't of Interior, 949 F.2d
332 (10th Cir. 1992) (discretion protected); Zumwalt v. United States, 928 F.2d 951
(10th Cir. 1991) (discretion protected); Summers v. United States, 905 F.2d 1212 (9th
Cir. 1990) (no discretion); Childers v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Mont.
1993), aff'd, 40 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 1994) (discretion protected); Valdez v. United
States, 837 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (discretion protected); Alderman v.
United States, 825 F. Supp. 742 (V.D. Va. 1993) (discretion protected); Schmitz v.
United States, 796 F. Supp. 263 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (discretion protected); Fahl v.
United States, 792 F. Supp. 80 (D. Ariz. 1992) (discretion protected); Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 782 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Ore. 1991) (discretion pro-
tected); Mattice v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 969 F.2d
818 (9th Cir. 1991) (discretion protected); Soto v. United States, 748 F. Supp. 727
(C.D. Cal. 1990) (no discretion).
93. See Summers v. United States, 905 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1990); Soto v. United
States, 748 F. Supp. 727 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
94. See Summers v. United States, 905 F.2d at 1215 (no evidence suggests the
failure to post warning signs was the "result of a decision reflecting the competing
considerations of the Service's sign policy"). This portion of the holding is probably
invalid after United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267, 1275 (1991) ("The focus of
the inquiry is not on the agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion con-
ferred by statute or regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken and on
whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.").
95. See e.g., Kiehn v. United States, 984 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1993): Johnson v.
United States, 949 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1991); Zumwalt v. United States, 928 F.2d 951,
955 (10th Cir. 1991) (absence of warning signs "was part of the overall policy deci-
sion to maintain the Trail in its wilderness state").
96. Appley Bros. v. United States, 7 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1993) (inspection of grain
warehouse; remand); In re Sabin Oral Polio Vaccine Products Liability litigation,
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reflect that Berkovitz has dampened the notion that Varig meant to
forbid all government liability for inspection and licensing error.97
The crucial factor in deciding licensing liability appears to be the
discretion granted by statute or regulation.9'
B. Application of the Berkovitz Tests
Most courts have read Berkovitz,99 as amplified by Gaubert,100 as
setting out a two-step analysis for any discretionary function claim
regardless of subject matter. The government must satisfy both tests
in order to claim the protection of section 2680(a). As indicated, the
United States has managed to do so within certain areas.
1. Does the act involve an element of judgment or choice?
The "judgment or choice" requirement turns on whether a "fed-
eral statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of
action for an employee to follow."' 0 ' Gaubert sets out the possible
patterns. 1°2 If performance is mandated and the government officer
complies, the action is protected discretion "because the action will
be deemed in furtherance of the policies which led to the promulga-
tion of the regulation."' 3 If performance is mandated and the actor
violates the directive "there will be no shelter from liability because
there is no room for choice and the action will be contrary to pol-
984 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1993) (polio vaccine licensing; no discretion); Ayala v. United
States, 980 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1992) (MSHA mine inspection failure; no discre-
tion); Daniels v. United States, 967 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1992) (OSHA inspection;
discretion protected); Redmon v. United States, 934 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1991) (pilot
certification; discretion protected); Foster v. United States, 923 F.2d 765 (9th Cir.
1991) (FAA pilot certification; discretion protected); Irving v. United States, 909
F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1990) (failure of OSHA inspectors to observe dangerous condition
at factory; remanded for further findings); Hayes v. United States, 899 F.2d 438 (5th
Cir. 1990) (no discretion in pilot licensing decision); Koppie v. Busey, 832 F. Supp.
1245 (N.D. Ind. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Koppie v. United States, 1 F.3d 651 (7th Cir.
1993) (FAA plane certification; discretion protected); Cooley v. United States, 791
F. Supp. 1294 (E.D. Tenn. 1992), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Myers v. United
States, 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 1994) (MSHA mine inspection; discretion protected by
the trial court but not by the appellate court).
97. See United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813-14 (1984) ("[W]hatever
else the discretionary function exception may include, it plainly was intended to en-
compass the discretionary acts of the Government acting in its role as a regulator of
the conduct of private individuals.").
98. See Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 1994); In re Sabin Oral Polio
Vaccine Products Liability Litigation, 984 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1993); Irving v. United
States, 909 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1990); but see Hayes v. United States, 899 F.2d 438 (5th
Cir. 1990) (decisions not policy related).
99. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
100. United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991).
101. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. at 536.
102. United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. at 1274.
103. Id.
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icy.' 1 4 Lastly if the directive allows the actor discretion "the very
existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a dis-
cretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of
the same policies which led to the promulgation of the
regulations."' 0
Gaubert further notes that not all agencies operate under compre-
hensive regulations. 106 In fact the reported cases often review deci-
sions made at a sub-regulatory level. Courts have probed into
guidelines, 07 project statements, 08 manuals,109 and checklists.110
These cases all have involved written documents, but oral under-
standings could serve the same purpose.
At the other extreme, one plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to man-
date agency action on the basis of an international treaty, the Hague
Convention on the Laws of Warfare. The court noted that the
Treaty was not self-executing. It found no United States law that
mandated the action desired by the plaintiff and upheld the govern-
ment's section 2680(a) claim 1 '
Johnson v. Sawyer" 2 addresses the conflicting directives. The
plaintiff alleged that an IRS agent improperly disclosed the plain-
tiff's tax information. The agent pointed to an IRS policy that en-
courages publicizing actions against certain tax violators. A federal
statute, however, protects the taxpayer's privacy and forbids disclo-
sure. Congressional supremacy carried the day, and the taxpayer
prevailed.
Relatively few cases at the appellate level are successful in show-
ing that a clear mandatory guideline has been violated by a govern-
ment officer. The Eighth Circuit made the point well in 1993113
stating: "Thus, to remove discretion from government employees, a
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id. ("Not all agencies issue comprehensive regulations, however. Some es-
tablish policy on a case-by-case basis, whether through adjudicatory proceedings or
through administration of agency programs. Others promulgate regulations on
some topics, but not on others. In addition, an agency may rely on internal guide-
lines rather than on published regulations.").
107. C.R-S. ex reL D.B.S. v. United States, 11 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1993); Summers
v. United States, 905 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1990); Flynn v. United States, 902 F.2d 1524
(10th Cir. 1990).
108. Zumwalt v. United States, 928 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1991).
109. Phillips v. United States, 956 F.2d 1071 (11th Cir. 1992); Fazi v. United
States, 935 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1991); Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355 (1st Cir.
1991).
110. Tracor/MBA, Inc. v. United States, 933 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1991).
111. Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965 (4th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992).
112. 980 F.2d 1490 (5th Cir.), modified, 4 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 1992).
113. C.R.S. ex reL D.B.S. v. United States, 11 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1993).
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regulation must be mandatory and it must clearly and specifically
define what the employees are supposed to do." 114
The cases finding a violation of mandated discretion give some
guidance. Summers v. United States 1 5 involved an injury allegedly
due to a violation of National Park Service safety guidelines. The
Ninth Circuit held the guidelines mandated corrective action as soon
as a hazard posing risk of serious injury had been identified. In
Love v. United States"6 the government failed to give a mandatory
statutory notice. Phillips v. United States"7 involved a violation of
mandatory directives in an Army Corps of Engineers safety manual,
Johnson v. Sawyer, 1 8 mentioned above, involved a statutory prohi-
bition against disclosure of taxpayer information. Tinkler v. United
States" 9 involved a mandate in Federal Aviation Administration
regulations to provide weather information to a pilot. In re Sabin
Oral Polio Vaccine Litigation 20 virtually repeated the Berkovitz fact
situation. Lastly Myers v. United States'2' found violations of Mine
Health and Safety Act provisions. The court concluded: "The
[Mine Safety and Health Administration] inspectors whose conduct
is at issue in the present case are not authorized to reweigh these
interests on a case-by-case basis. Rather, they are to determine
compliance and, in the event of non-compliance, issue the
mandatory citations and orders."'" Judge Guy of the Sixth Circuit
differed with his colleagues on the section 2680(a) issue and im-
pliedly on the possibility of denying the government protection in
regulatory cases. Judge Guy wrote: "I do not think Congress ever
intended the FTCA to be an invitation to parse the rules and regula-
tions of regulatory agencies looking for those functions the agencies
arguably were required to perform, and then attempting to have lia-
bility follow those functions." 23
What parsing of rules and regulations has been done, however,
typically has favored the government. Commonly the plaintiff finds
a supposedly mandatory provision that the government officer has
violated. The plaintiff asserts there is no judgment or choice al-
lowed to the government officer. The government attorneys, how-
ever, have been quite skilled in taking the sting out of "shalls" and
"musts." A few cases are illustrative.
114. Id. at 799.
115. 905 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1990).
116. 915 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1989).
117. 956 F.2d 1071 (11th Cir. 1992).
118. 980 F.2d 1490 (5th Cir.), modified, 4 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 1992).
119. 982 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1992).
120. 984 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1993).
121. 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 1994).
122. Id. at 898.
123. Id. at 905.
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In Kelly v. United States'2 the plaintiff alleged that regulations
mandated an investigation of charges of misconduct against a Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent. The First Circuit noted that
"will" and "must" can have multiple meanings and took a common
sense reading of the regulation. "If the Manual were read to man-
date that every bit of idle gossip intimating employee misconduct
had to be reported, it would constitute an open invitation to drug
traffickers to make baseless claims against DEA agents."125 In Pow-
ers v. United States126 a statutory requirement that the federal officer
"shall" make flood insurance information available was qualified by
"from time to time" and "as may be necessary." Those words were
sufficient to give protected discretion to the director.
Courts also have given the government the benefit of the doubt in
defining the terms under which mandatory duties are imposed. In
Fazi v. United States'27 the victim of an armed robbery alleged that
the United States Postal Service had violated its regulations in not
providing him with an armed escort. The case turned on whether
blank traveler's checks should be included within the term "negotia-
ble instruments" for which the armed escort was required. The Sec-
ond Circuit observed that "a decision to treat blank traveler's
checks like negotiable or bearer instruments was not required by the
Manual, and any such decision would be based on a balancing of
economic and policy factors."'"
Just because a result is mandated does not require that it be
reached in a particular way. In Zumwalt v. United Stares 29 National
Park Service policies appeared to mandate the repair of dangerous
park trails. The court observed that the project statement did not
spell out how hazardousness determinations were to be made. Fur-
ther, "[o]nce a hazardous section is identified, Park Service person-
nel must determine what type of improvements to make and where
the improvements should be located based on wilderness policy and
the need for public safety."'130 This left sufficient discretion to the
government officer to allow the section 2680(a) immunity. Similarly
in Daniels v. United States131 an Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) regulation required that "end saws on the
trimmer shall be guarded."' 32 However, the kind of guard em-
ployed was a matter of discretion. 33
124. 924 F.2d 355 (1st Cir. 1991).
125. Id. at 361.
126. 996 F.2d 1121 (11th Cir. 1993).
127. 935 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1991).
128. Id. at 539.
129. 928 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1991).
130. Id. at 954.
131. 967 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1992).
132. Id. at 1465.
133. Id.
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2. Is the judgment of the kind section 2680(a) was intended
to protect?
If a government officer violates an established statute, regulation,
or policy, the discretionary function is lost and the government must
defend its conduct on other grounds. The government's success on
the question whether the conduct violates an established policy,
however, leaves the government only halfway to a successful discre-
tionary function defense. Varig, Berkovitz, and Gaubert make clear
that the government also must show "whether that judgment is of
the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to
shield."'' 34 This test arises from Varig's reading of congressional in-
tent. Congress in enacting section 2680(a) desired "to prevent judi-
cial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions
grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the me-
dium of an action in tort."' 35 As Berkovitz elaborates: "The excep-
tion, properly construed, therefore protects only governmental
actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.
'13 6
The Second Circuit in Andrulonis v. United States sharpened the fo-
cus by asking whether the alleged policy actions were "based on the
purposes the regulatory regime seeks to accomplish."' 37 If so the
matter is protected under section 2680(a). If not the discretionary
function does not apply even if the government has not violated any
legal standard.
Courts have given considerable deference to government asser-
tions of policy discretion. Economic factors often are cited with lit-
tle evidence to back up the claim. This claim is made easier by
Gaubert's removal of any requirement that an actual decision has
been made by the government officer in question.138 After Gaubert
it seems sufficient to claim that budgetary consideration could have
been a factor.
Non-economic policy considerations may outweigh safety con-
cerns. Considerable deference to national defense judgments is re-
flected in Ayer v. United States'39 and Creek Nation Indian Housing
Authority v. United States.'40 Ayer endorsed the policy factors be-
hind the Air Force's favoring military readiness over safety in the
design of a missile launch control chamber. Creek Nation allowed
the military great latitude in bomb design decisions. Quoting from
the United States Supreme Court decision in Boyle v. United Tech-
134. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
135. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
136. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. at 537.
137. Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting
United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. at 1275 n.7).
138. United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. at 1275.
139. 902 F.2d 1038 (1st Cir. 1990).
140. 905 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1990).
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nologies Corp., 4' the court observed "that the selection of the ap-
propriate design for military equipment . . . involves . .. the
balancing of many technical, military, and even social considera-
tions, including specifically the trade-off between greater safety and
greater combat effectiveness."' 42
The cases involving the United States Park Service also show a
willingness to accept government assertions about policy decisions.
The desire for wilderness preservation sustained the lack of warning
signs in Zumwalt v. United States.'43 The court found the decision
"was part of the overall policy decision to maintain the Trail in its
wilderness state."'" The matter was phrased more colorfully by the
Tenth Circuit when it observed that "many Park visitors value
backcountry climbing as one of the few experiences free from gov-
ernment regulation or interference.'
' 45
One of the most thorough evaluations of policy judgment occurs
in D.B.S. ex rel. C.R.S. v. United States."4 The plaintiff and his fam-
ily were infected with the AIDS virus from blood transfusions re-
ceived in the military. The plaintiff faulted the government for
inadequate blood screening procedures and for failure to warn that
contamination might have occurred. The plaintiff sought to portray
the case as one of simple professional medical negligence. The
Eighth Circuit disagreed. The court concluded:
[The decision to warn] implicates competing concerns of safety
and cost. The government could have balanced the fact that
identifying all those in [plaintiff's] position might have low-
ered the risks of transmission against the possibility that public
awareness of AIDS and warnings from other sources might
have obviated the need for notification from the Army, the
fact that the risk of infection was statistically slight, the risk
that military morale could be affected, and the judgment that
scarce resources could be better allocated elsewhere."47
Other courts have sided with plaintiffs, holding that certain gov-
ernment decisions did not involve issues of public policy. The fol-
lowing have been held not to constitute public policy decisions:
whether a situation created a job safety hazard;148 whether research
laboratory conditions were safe for rabies research; 49 and whether
141. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
142. Creek Nation Indian Hous. Auth. v. United States, 905 F.2d at 313 (quoting
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. at 510-13).
143. 928 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1991).
144. Id. at 955.
145. Johnson v. United States Dep't of Interior, 949 F.2d 332, 337 (10th Cir.
1991).
146. 11 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1993).
147. IA at 801.
148. Routh v. United States, 941 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1991).
149. Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1991).
1995]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
a mine safety inspector made proper recommendations regarding
electrical connections for lights to a continuous mining machine.
As mentioned earlier it is not essential that the decision maker
actually weigh policy objectives in reaching his or her decision.151
The Fourth Circuit in Baum v. United States made the point well:
Rather than requiring a fact-based inquiry into the circum-
stances surrounding the government actor's exercise of a par-
ticular discretionary function, we are of opinion that a
reviewing court in the usual case is to look to the nature of the
challenged decision in an objective, or general sense, and ask
whether that decision is one which we would expect inherently
to be grounded in considerations of policy.152
IV. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
United States Supreme Court decisions provide benchmarks for
assessing the workings of section 2680(a) in the lower federal courts
and in the administrative agencies. As such decisions accrue two
questions are appropriate. First, with what clarity has the Supreme
Court defined the amorphous legislative term "discretionary func-
tion"? That is, are standards clear, allowing legitimate claims to be
paid promptly and illegitimate claims to be rejected before expen-
sive litigation is pursued? Second, does the Court's interpretation of
section 2680(a) generally expand or limit government liability?
In 1977, after a quarter century in which the only Supreme Court
guidance came from Dalehite, clarity was lacking and lower court
decisions expanded plaintiffs' abilities to assert novel theories of lia-
bility against the United States.'53 The latter factor may have been
a product of the times. Vietnam and Watergate had put unchecked
executive discretion in a bad light, with increased judicial willingness
to reject claims of protected discretion. Yet judicial decisions
handed down at the time in section 2680(a) actions offered little
more than the conclusion that courts would undertake a reasoned
case-by-case analysis to distinguish protected from unprotected
discretion.
A decade later in Varig Airlines the Supreme Court appeared to
shift the policy balance toward the government. Varig insisted that
courts examine the nature of the conduct rather than the status of
the actor in weighing application of section 2680(a). This reaffirma-
tion of Dalehite revalidated the Court's position that discretion
could be exercised at mid-level and low-level government. More
importantly, a second Varig holding, that regulatory acts are discre-
150. Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1992).
151. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
152. 986 F.2d 716, 720-21 (4th Cir. 1993).
153. Changing Meanings, supra note 5, at 40-42.
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tionary, promised to remove a considerable chunk of the recent
business of the federal courts in section 2680(a) actions.
The last decade has added two more Supreme Court precedents.
Berkovitz restored hope to plaintiffs by resurrecting the possibility
of liability for regulatory acts. Gaubert, however, appears to pre-
clude government liability for most financial institution regulatory
claims. Gaubert's most lasting value may be in its implicit rejection
of any need for examination of whether government officers actu-
ally engaged in reasoned policy making.
The Berkovitz formulation of section 2680(a) analysis, enhanced
by Gaubert, has proved to be the most useful analytic tool offered
by the Supreme Court in discretionary function jurisprudence. Most
current lower federal court decisions track Berkovitz's two-stage
analysis: 1) determining first whether existing law gives government
officers the legal authority to make the questioned decision and 2)
determining then whether the decision made involves the social,
economic, and political factors that Congress meant to protect
under section 2680(a). This dual analysis does not answer every dis-
cretionary function question. It does allow, however, a more struc-
tured analysis than did previous Supreme Court tests.
The first part of the Berkovitz test encourages a plaintiff's attor-
ney to search for a provision of statute, regulation, or informal pol-
icy violated by a government official. As the cases from the lower
courts indicate, this is not as easy as it sounds. Courts have strug-
gled to find in lengthy and poorly written directives evidence that
government officers exercised a discretion they were not granted.
The impression arises that for one judge "shall" can only mean
"must" and that for another judge "shall" means "may, if the gov-
ernment wants."
The clear rule, however, may not be the right rule. The emphasis
on finding a violation of a regulation, directive, or office manual
may ignore congressional objectives. As has been observed in many
bureaucracies, the certain way to cripple operations is to insist on
literal compliance with every regulatory provision. Even if the law-
making authority's policy is that rules are to be enforced, it is not
clear that tort sanctions are an appropriate means of enforcement.
Quite possibly discretionary function law should borrow common
law rules for using a statute or regulation to set a standard of care.
Gaubert recognized that a government official need not have
made an actual policy-based decision in order to enjoy discretionary
protection., Even an official who has engaged in an unreasoned ex-
ercise of discretion is protected if the court finds he made the kind
of decision that might have had policy implications.
This rule is troubling. If part of the justification for section
2680(a) is to avoid paralyzing federal decision making for fear of
liability, the Gaubert rule reaches too broadly. Why protect the offi-
1995]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
cial who never may have thought about the policy impacts of her
discretion? Gaubert does, however, offer considerable saving.
If under an alternative to Berkovitz the law were to demand that
an official actually engage in reasoned decisionmaking, plaintiffs
would scour records or construct testimony to show a lack of rea-
soned discretion. Defendants, by contrast, in support of their argu-
ment for a reasoned policy decision, would bring forward after-the-
fact testimony that at best might involve selective memory and at
worst undetectable perjury. We also would expect an increase in
paperwork as a tort-averse agency made sure to document any ac-
tions that might lead to subsequent tort liability. The Gaubert rule
eliminates or lessens the need for all that.
A full review of the lower court cases since Berkovitz leaves the
impression that plaintiffs' lawyers are playing some decided long
shots. In certain subject areas the assertion of protected govern-
ment discretion is highly likely to be successful. When cases involve
violations of law, however, the courts generally resolve ambiguity in
favor of the government. The courts are quite ready to find policy
implicated in a wide variety of situations, especially in application of
federal regulatory power.
V. CONCLUSION
In short, a fiscally cautious Congress has reason to be pleased
with the evolution of discretionary function law. The Supreme
Court well may be cautious in accepting further discretionary func-
tion cases. Government attorneys can feel vindicated that their in-
terpretations of the exception, both in the administrative agencies
and the courts, largely have been approved. Plaintiffs and their at-
torneys must recognize that the demise of sovereign immunity has
not opened the United States to any claim of responsibility. Crea-
tive lawyering may be rewarded, of course, but both lawyers and
plaintiffs should know they are playing in a game where the rules
favor the house.
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